Of course, if a disclosure does not fall within the confines of the informed consent statute, then its fiduciary nature is retained. For example, the informed consent statute does not remove a doctor’s common law fiduciary duty “to disclose to his patient any material information concerning the patient’s physical condition.” Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 354 (Utah 1980). The Nixdorf disclosure requirement “differs from that found in the informed con ent context.” Id. at 354 n.20. Informed consent applies only to pretreatment information about the risks of a procedure or treatment; the fiduciary duty to disclose requires health care providers to apprise patients of material physical conditions throughout the course of their health care. Therefore, patients have a cause of action for breach of the fiduciary duty of disclosure except where a disclosure is explicitly governed by the informed consent statute.
Benda v. Catholic Diocese of Salt Lake City, 2016 UT 37
We conclude that adoption of a cause of action for parents’ loss of filial consortium due to tortious injury to their minor child is neither precluded by our decision in Boucher nor legislatively preempted. For the reasons described above, we hereby adopt a cause of action allowing parents to recover for loss of filial consortium due to tortious injury to a minor child in cases where the injury meets the definition set forth in Utah Code section 30-2-11(1)(a).
A cause of action based on an intrusion upon seclusion was recognized by this court in Turner v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 832 P.2d 62 (Utah.Ct.App.), cert. denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992). In Turner, we stated that, in order to establish a claim of intrusion upon seclusion, the plaintiff must prove two elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that there was “an intentional substantial intrusion, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of the complaining party,” and (2) that the intrusion “would be highly offensive to the reasonable person.” Id. at 67.
A list of linked video content can be accessed under the "Uploads" option below.
How should a defense attorney combat the Reptilian Theory in a medmal case? - YouTube
Rules of the Road TM in Medical Malpractice Cases – Words and Values Matter. - YouTube
Medical Malpractice 101 Part 1 - Insurance Industry Reserves - YouTube
Portion of Gerry Spence closing argument in Lee Harvey Oswald case. - YouTube
Gerry Spence Closing Argument - Trial Lawyer's College - New York Regional Seminar 2006 - YouTube
Rick Friedman speaking on the importance of lay witnesses - YouTube
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 47
f) Challenges for cause. A challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and shall be heard and determined by the court. The juror challenged and any other person may be examined as a witness on the hearing of such challenge. A challenge for cause may be taken on one or more of the following grounds. On its own motion the court may remove a juror upon the same grounds....
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 47
(e) Challenges to individual jurors; number of peremptory challenges. The challenges to individual jurors are either peremptory or for cause. Each party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges. Several defendants or several plaintiffs shall be considered as a single party for the purposes of making peremptory challenges unless there is a substantial controversy between them, in which case the court shall allow as many additional peremptory challenges as is just. If one or two alternate jurors are called, each party is entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those otherwise allowed.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 47
(a) Examination of jurors. The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit the parties or their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is material and proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as is material and proper. Prior to examining the jurors, the court may make a preliminary statement of the case. The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to make a preliminary statement of the case, and notify the parties in advance of trial...
In light of "the important role that jury voir dire has in ensuring that all litigants in a case receive a fair and impartial jury," State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 797 (Utah 1991), courts must liberally exercise voir dire beyond minimal constitutional requirements in order "to eliminate bias and prejudice from the trial proceedings..."
...even when specific examples of tort-reform propaganda are not presented to the court, a "plaintiff has a legitimate interest in discovering which jurors may have read or heard information generally on medical negligence or tort reform."
In light of the pervasive dissemination of tort-reform information, and the corresponding potential for general exposure to such information by potential jurors, a plaintiff is entitled to know which potential jurors, if any, have been so exposed. See id. Plaintiff is entitled to such information absent any particular showing of specific campaigns, advertisements, or literature offered for the purpose of showing potential prejudice. See id. Failure to ask such questions ignores the plaintiffs "need to gather information to assist in exercising ... peremptory challenges..."
This court has held that the questions a trial court asks to uncover such attitudes and biases can include questions "about [a potential juror's] exposure to tort-reform and medical negligence propaganda." Id. at 467.
In Evans v. Doty, 824 P.2d 460 (Utah Ct.App.1991), cert. denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992), this court determined that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to ask jurors questions about their exposure to tort reform information...
Our decision in Evans was reiterated in Barrett. In that case, the trial court again failed to ask potential jurors specific tort reform/medical malpractice questions similar to the questions at issue in Evans. Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96, 98 (Utah Ct.App.1993)
In Evans v. Dory, the Utah Court of Appeals determined that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to ask jurors questions about their exposure to tort reform information, concluding that although the trial court did ask whether a potential juror's exposure to medical negligence information would prevent that juror's ability to be fair and impartial, this question was only effective in identifying proper for-cause challenges. See id. at 467. The trial court's "questions did not allow the plaintiff an opportunity to know which of the prospective jurors had been exposed to tort reform propaganda, totally aside from whether the prospective jurors would themselves admit such exposure had changed their attitudes or biased them. See also (Alcazar v. University of Utah Hospitals, 188 P. 3d 490 (Utah Ct. App. 2008))